diff --git a/backport-CVE-2025-14087.patch b/backport-CVE-2025-14087.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f84052a42c83d4d29d17a4f032102e3df28d14a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-CVE-2025-14087.patch @@ -0,0 +1,458 @@ +From 31f82e22e21bae520b7228f7f57d357fb20df8a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Philip Withnall +Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2025 19:02:56 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 1/3] gvariant-parser: Fix potential integer overflow parsing + (byte)strings + +The termination condition for parsing string and bytestring literals in +GVariant text format input was subject to an integer overflow for input +string (or bytestring) literals longer than `INT_MAX`. + +Fix that by counting as a `size_t` rather than as an `int`. The counter +can never correctly be negative. + +Spotted by treeplus. Thanks to the Sovereign Tech Resilience programme +from the Sovereign Tech Agency. ID: #YWH-PGM9867-145 + +Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall +Fixes: #3834 +--- + glib/gvariant-parser.c | 10 +++++----- + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/glib/gvariant-parser.c b/glib/gvariant-parser.c +index 2f1d3db9f6..2d6e9856f8 100644 +--- a/glib/gvariant-parser.c ++++ b/glib/gvariant-parser.c +@@ -609,7 +609,7 @@ ast_resolve (AST *ast, + { + GVariant *value; + gchar *pattern; +- gint i, j = 0; ++ size_t i, j = 0; + + pattern = ast_get_pattern (ast, error); + +@@ -1637,9 +1637,9 @@ string_free (AST *ast) + * No leading/trailing space allowed. */ + static gboolean + unicode_unescape (const gchar *src, +- gint *src_ofs, ++ size_t *src_ofs, + gchar *dest, +- gint *dest_ofs, ++ size_t *dest_ofs, + gsize length, + SourceRef *ref, + GError **error) +@@ -1700,7 +1700,7 @@ string_parse (TokenStream *stream, + gsize length; + gchar quote; + gchar *str; +- gint i, j; ++ size_t i, j; + + token_stream_start_ref (stream, &ref); + token = token_stream_get (stream); +@@ -1833,7 +1833,7 @@ bytestring_parse (TokenStream *stream, + gsize length; + gchar quote; + gchar *str; +- gint i, j; ++ size_t i, j; + + token_stream_start_ref (stream, &ref); + token = token_stream_get (stream); +-- +GitLab + + +From ac9de0871281cf734f6e269988f90a2521582a08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Philip Withnall +Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2025 19:19:16 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 2/3] gvariant-parser: Use size_t to count numbers of child + elements +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +Rather than using `gint`, which could overflow for arrays (or dicts, or +tuples) longer than `INT_MAX`. There may be other limits which prevent +parsed containers becoming that long, but we might as well make the type +system reflect the programmer’s intention as best it can anyway. + +For arrays and tuples this is straightforward. For dictionaries, it’s +slightly complicated by the fact that the code used +`dict->n_children == -1` to indicate that the `Dictionary` struct in +question actually represented a single freestanding dict entry. In +GVariant text format, that would be `{1, "one"}`. + +The implementation previously didn’t define the semantics of +`dict->n_children < -1`. + +Now, instead, change `Dictionary.n_children` to `size_t`, and define a +magic value `DICTIONARY_N_CHILDREN_FREESTANDING_ENTRY` to indicate that +the `Dictionary` represents a single freestanding dict entry. + +This magic value is `SIZE_MAX`, and given that a dictionary entry takes +more than one byte to represent in GVariant text format, that means it’s +not possible to have that many entries in a parsed dictionary, so this +magic value won’t be hit by a normal dictionary. An assertion checks +this anyway. + +Spotted while working on #3834. + +Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall +--- + glib/gvariant-parser.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ + 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/glib/gvariant-parser.c b/glib/gvariant-parser.c +index 2d6e9856f8..519baa3f36 100644 +--- a/glib/gvariant-parser.c ++++ b/glib/gvariant-parser.c +@@ -662,9 +662,9 @@ static AST *parse (TokenStream *stream, + GError **error); + + static void +-ast_array_append (AST ***array, +- gint *n_items, +- AST *ast) ++ast_array_append (AST ***array, ++ size_t *n_items, ++ AST *ast) + { + if ((*n_items & (*n_items - 1)) == 0) + *array = g_renew (AST *, *array, *n_items ? 2 ** n_items : 1); +@@ -673,10 +673,10 @@ ast_array_append (AST ***array, + } + + static void +-ast_array_free (AST **array, +- gint n_items) ++ast_array_free (AST **array, ++ size_t n_items) + { +- gint i; ++ size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < n_items; i++) + ast_free (array[i]); +@@ -685,11 +685,11 @@ ast_array_free (AST **array, + + static gchar * + ast_array_get_pattern (AST **array, +- gint n_items, ++ size_t n_items, + GError **error) + { + gchar *pattern; +- gint i; ++ size_t i; + + /* Find the pattern which applies to all children in the array, by l-folding a + * coalesce operation. +@@ -721,7 +721,7 @@ ast_array_get_pattern (AST **array, + * pair of values. + */ + { +- int j = 0; ++ size_t j = 0; + + while (TRUE) + { +@@ -969,7 +969,7 @@ typedef struct + AST ast; + + AST **children; +- gint n_children; ++ size_t n_children; + } Array; + + static gchar * +@@ -1002,7 +1002,7 @@ array_get_value (AST *ast, + Array *array = (Array *) ast; + const GVariantType *childtype; + GVariantBuilder builder; +- gint i; ++ size_t i; + + if (!g_variant_type_is_array (type)) + return ast_type_error (ast, type, error); +@@ -1088,7 +1088,7 @@ typedef struct + AST ast; + + AST **children; +- gint n_children; ++ size_t n_children; + } Tuple; + + static gchar * +@@ -1098,7 +1098,7 @@ tuple_get_pattern (AST *ast, + Tuple *tuple = (Tuple *) ast; + gchar *result = NULL; + gchar **parts; +- gint i; ++ size_t i; + + parts = g_new (gchar *, tuple->n_children + 4); + parts[tuple->n_children + 1] = (gchar *) ")"; +@@ -1128,7 +1128,7 @@ tuple_get_value (AST *ast, + Tuple *tuple = (Tuple *) ast; + const GVariantType *childtype; + GVariantBuilder builder; +- gint i; ++ size_t i; + + if (!g_variant_type_is_tuple (type)) + return ast_type_error (ast, type, error); +@@ -1320,9 +1320,16 @@ typedef struct + + AST **keys; + AST **values; +- gint n_children; ++ ++ /* Iff this is DICTIONARY_N_CHILDREN_FREESTANDING_ENTRY then this struct ++ * represents a single freestanding dict entry (`{1, "one"}`) rather than a ++ * full dict. In the freestanding case, @keys and @values have exactly one ++ * member each. */ ++ size_t n_children; + } Dictionary; + ++#define DICTIONARY_N_CHILDREN_FREESTANDING_ENTRY ((size_t) -1) ++ + static gchar * + dictionary_get_pattern (AST *ast, + GError **error) +@@ -1337,7 +1344,7 @@ dictionary_get_pattern (AST *ast, + return g_strdup ("Ma{**}"); + + key_pattern = ast_array_get_pattern (dict->keys, +- abs (dict->n_children), ++ (dict->n_children == DICTIONARY_N_CHILDREN_FREESTANDING_ENTRY) ? 1 : dict->n_children, + error); + + if (key_pattern == NULL) +@@ -1368,7 +1375,7 @@ dictionary_get_pattern (AST *ast, + return NULL; + + result = g_strdup_printf ("M%s{%c%s}", +- dict->n_children > 0 ? "a" : "", ++ (dict->n_children > 0 && dict->n_children != DICTIONARY_N_CHILDREN_FREESTANDING_ENTRY) ? "a" : "", + key_char, value_pattern); + g_free (value_pattern); + +@@ -1382,7 +1389,7 @@ dictionary_get_value (AST *ast, + { + Dictionary *dict = (Dictionary *) ast; + +- if (dict->n_children == -1) ++ if (dict->n_children == DICTIONARY_N_CHILDREN_FREESTANDING_ENTRY) + { + const GVariantType *subtype; + GVariantBuilder builder; +@@ -1415,7 +1422,7 @@ dictionary_get_value (AST *ast, + { + const GVariantType *entry, *key, *val; + GVariantBuilder builder; +- gint i; ++ size_t i; + + if (!g_variant_type_is_subtype_of (type, G_VARIANT_TYPE_DICTIONARY)) + return ast_type_error (ast, type, error); +@@ -1456,12 +1463,12 @@ static void + dictionary_free (AST *ast) + { + Dictionary *dict = (Dictionary *) ast; +- gint n_children; ++ size_t n_children; + +- if (dict->n_children > -1) +- n_children = dict->n_children; +- else ++ if (dict->n_children == DICTIONARY_N_CHILDREN_FREESTANDING_ENTRY) + n_children = 1; ++ else ++ n_children = dict->n_children; + + ast_array_free (dict->keys, n_children); + ast_array_free (dict->values, n_children); +@@ -1479,7 +1486,7 @@ dictionary_parse (TokenStream *stream, + maybe_wrapper, dictionary_get_value, + dictionary_free + }; +- gint n_keys, n_values; ++ size_t n_keys, n_values; + gboolean only_one; + Dictionary *dict; + AST *first; +@@ -1522,7 +1529,7 @@ dictionary_parse (TokenStream *stream, + goto error; + + g_assert (n_keys == 1 && n_values == 1); +- dict->n_children = -1; ++ dict->n_children = DICTIONARY_N_CHILDREN_FREESTANDING_ENTRY; + + return (AST *) dict; + } +@@ -1555,6 +1562,7 @@ dictionary_parse (TokenStream *stream, + } + + g_assert (n_keys == n_values); ++ g_assert (n_keys != DICTIONARY_N_CHILDREN_FREESTANDING_ENTRY); + dict->n_children = n_keys; + + return (AST *) dict; +-- +GitLab + + +From acaabfedff42e974334dd5368e6103d2845aaba6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Philip Withnall +Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2025 19:25:58 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 3/3] gvariant-parser: Convert error handling code to use + size_t + +The error handling code allows for printing out the range of input bytes +related to a parsing error. This was previously done using `gint`, but +the input could be longer than `INT_MAX`, so it should really be done +using `size_t`. + +Spotted while working on #3834. + +Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall +--- + glib/gvariant-parser.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------- + 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/glib/gvariant-parser.c b/glib/gvariant-parser.c +index 519baa3f36..1b1ddd654b 100644 +--- a/glib/gvariant-parser.c ++++ b/glib/gvariant-parser.c +@@ -91,7 +91,9 @@ g_variant_parser_get_error_quark (void) + + typedef struct + { +- gint start, end; ++ /* Offsets from the start of the input, in bytes. Can be equal when referring ++ * to a point rather than a range. The invariant `end >= start` always holds. */ ++ size_t start, end; + } SourceRef; + + G_GNUC_PRINTF(5, 0) +@@ -106,14 +108,16 @@ parser_set_error_va (GError **error, + GString *msg = g_string_new (NULL); + + if (location->start == location->end) +- g_string_append_printf (msg, "%d", location->start); ++ g_string_append_printf (msg, "%" G_GSIZE_FORMAT, location->start); + else +- g_string_append_printf (msg, "%d-%d", location->start, location->end); ++ g_string_append_printf (msg, "%" G_GSIZE_FORMAT "-%" G_GSIZE_FORMAT, ++ location->start, location->end); + + if (other != NULL) + { + g_assert (other->start != other->end); +- g_string_append_printf (msg, ",%d-%d", other->start, other->end); ++ g_string_append_printf (msg, ",%" G_GSIZE_FORMAT "-%" G_GSIZE_FORMAT, ++ other->start, other->end); + } + g_string_append_c (msg, ':'); + +@@ -140,11 +144,15 @@ parser_set_error (GError **error, + + typedef struct + { ++ /* We should always have the following ordering constraint: ++ * start <= this <= stream <= end ++ * Additionally, unless in an error or EOF state, `this < stream`. ++ */ + const gchar *start; + const gchar *stream; + const gchar *end; + +- const gchar *this; ++ const gchar *this; /* (nullable) */ + } TokenStream; + + +@@ -175,7 +183,7 @@ token_stream_set_error (TokenStream *stream, + static gboolean + token_stream_prepare (TokenStream *stream) + { +- gint brackets = 0; ++ gssize brackets = 0; + const gchar *end; + + if (stream->this != NULL) +@@ -407,7 +415,7 @@ static void + pattern_copy (gchar **out, + const gchar **in) + { +- gint brackets = 0; ++ gssize brackets = 0; + + while (**in == 'a' || **in == 'm' || **in == 'M') + *(*out)++ = *(*in)++; +@@ -2765,7 +2773,7 @@ g_variant_builder_add_parsed (GVariantBuilder *builder, + static gboolean + parse_num (const gchar *num, + const gchar *limit, +- guint *result) ++ size_t *result) + { + gchar *endptr; + gint64 bignum; +@@ -2775,10 +2783,12 @@ parse_num (const gchar *num, + if (endptr != limit) + return FALSE; + ++ /* The upper bound here is more restrictive than it technically needs to be, ++ * but should be enough for any practical situation: */ + if (bignum < 0 || bignum > G_MAXINT) + return FALSE; + +- *result = (guint) bignum; ++ *result = (size_t) bignum; + + return TRUE; + } +@@ -2789,7 +2799,7 @@ add_last_line (GString *err, + { + const gchar *last_nl; + gchar *chomped; +- gint i; ++ size_t i; + + /* This is an error at the end of input. If we have a file + * with newlines, that's probably the empty string after the +@@ -2934,7 +2944,7 @@ g_variant_parse_error_print_context (GError *error, + + if (dash == NULL || colon < dash) + { +- guint point; ++ size_t point; + + /* we have a single point */ + if (!parse_num (error->message, colon, &point)) +@@ -2952,7 +2962,7 @@ g_variant_parse_error_print_context (GError *error, + /* We have one or two ranges... */ + if (comma && comma < colon) + { +- guint start1, end1, start2, end2; ++ size_t start1, end1, start2, end2; + const gchar *dash2; + + /* Two ranges */ +@@ -2968,7 +2978,7 @@ g_variant_parse_error_print_context (GError *error, + } + else + { +- guint start, end; ++ size_t start, end; + + /* One range */ + if (!parse_num (error->message, dash, &start) || !parse_num (dash + 1, colon, &end)) +-- +GitLab diff --git a/backport-CVE-2025-14512.patch b/backport-CVE-2025-14512.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a7d2602819120368b4bb7b6ec7eb3668f83a0ee5 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-CVE-2025-14512.patch @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +From 1909d8ea9297287f1ff6862968608dcf06e60523 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Philip Withnall +Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2025 16:37:19 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] gfileattribute: Fix integer overflow calculating escaping for + byte strings + +The number of invalid characters in the byte string (characters which +would have to be percent-encoded) was only stored in an `int`, which +gave the possibility of a long string largely full of invalid +characters overflowing this and allowing an attacker-controlled buffer +size to be allocated. + +This could be triggered by an attacker controlled file attribute (of +type `G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_BYTE_STRING`), such as +`G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_THUMBNAIL_PATH` or `G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_NAME`, +being read by user code. + +Spotted by Codean Labs. + +Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall + +Fixes: #3845 +--- + gio/gfileattribute.c | 11 +++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/gio/gfileattribute.c b/gio/gfileattribute.c +index c6fde60fa9..d3083e5bd8 100644 +--- a/gio/gfileattribute.c ++++ b/gio/gfileattribute.c +@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ + + #include "config.h" + ++#include + #include + + #include "gfileattribute.h" +@@ -166,11 +167,12 @@ valid_char (char c) + return c >= 32 && c <= 126 && c != '\\'; + } + ++/* Returns NULL on error */ + static char * + escape_byte_string (const char *str) + { + size_t i, len; +- int num_invalid; ++ size_t num_invalid; + char *escaped_val, *p; + unsigned char c; + const char hex_digits[] = "0123456789abcdef"; +@@ -188,7 +190,12 @@ escape_byte_string (const char *str) + return g_strdup (str); + else + { +- escaped_val = g_malloc (len + num_invalid*3 + 1); ++ /* Check for overflow. We want to check the inequality: ++ * !(len + num_invalid * 3 + 1 > SIZE_MAX) */ ++ if (num_invalid >= (SIZE_MAX - len) / 3) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ escaped_val = g_malloc (len + num_invalid * 3 + 1); + + p = escaped_val; + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) +-- +GitLab \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/glib2.spec b/glib2.spec index c82965f99bbfa327dc3a2aabcecfd9752cd034e4..b3f1df50e56e118e909e003eebca3b8f9671db8a 100644 --- a/glib2.spec +++ b/glib2.spec @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ Name: glib2 Version: 2.72.2 -Release: 23 +Release: 24 Summary: The core library that forms the basis for projects such as GTK+ and GNOME License: LGPLv2+ URL: http://www.gtk.org @@ -94,6 +94,8 @@ patch6080: backport-CVE-2025-3360.patch Patch6081: backport-CVE-2025-4373.patch Patch6082: backport-CVE-2025-7039.patch Patch6083: backport-CVE-2025-13601.patch +Patch6084: backport-CVE-2025-14087.patch +Patch6085: backport-CVE-2025-14512.patch BuildRequires: chrpath gcc gcc-c++ gettext perl-interpreter BUildRequires: glibc-devel libattr-devel libselinux-devel meson @@ -280,6 +282,9 @@ glib-compile-schemas %{_datadir}/glib-2.0/schemas &> /dev/null || : %endif %changelog +* Sat Dec 13 2025 hanhuihui - 2.72.2-24 +- fix CVE-2025-14087, CVE-2025-14512 + * Sat Nov 29 2025 Funda Wang - 2.72.2-23 - fix CVE-2025-13601